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Abstract
When it comes to data, privacy and innovation often appear to pull in opposite directions, as seen in the
differing policy approaches taken in the US and EU [1]. Fully homomorphic encryption offers to resolve this
conflict by making third-party data analysis possible without revealing user data. Policymakers need to be
ready for this paradigm shift. This article describes this new technology and its potential policy implications,
particularly in the context of recent EU and US data protection policy.
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When it comes to data, privacy and innovation often appear to pull in opposite directions. Full homomorphic
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Policy Background
With the rise of modern telecommunications net-
works over the past 50 years, consumers have en-
trusted more and more private data to companies,
turning encryption from a mathematical niche
into an everyday business necessity. Initially, pol-
icy focused on encouraging companies to encrypt
their data so that customers’ personal informa-
tion would be stored in a coded form which kept
it private. The US introduced a Data Encryption
Standard (DES) as early as 1972. However, en-
cryption traditionally limits the usefulness of data
for applications, such as training machine learn-
ing models. These data-driven technologies have
become increasingly important and economically
valuable in the early 21st century, introducing a
potential tension between privacy and economic
value. The EU and US, with the exception of Cal-
ifornia, have taken different policy approaches to
this problem. The EU’s General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR) champions privacy while re-
stricting data sharing, whereas the US has opted
for a more open approach. This divergence has
caused tension particularly around transatlantic
data sharing. In the Schrems II case [2] the EU
found that existing data sharing protocols with
the US were incompatible with GDPR.
Fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) is a tech-
nology with the potential to completely re-write
this narrative. Proved possible by Craig Gentry
in 2009, FHE allows data to be analysed while
still securely encrypted, meaning that companies
would have the ability share their customers’ data
with third parties for analysis without ever giving
them access to sensitive information. Technical
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advances will make Gentry’s theoretical discovery
an increasingly viable technology in the coming
decade. Policymakers need to be prepared for the
challenges and opportunities this presents.
Scientific Background
From a technical point of view, the field of homo-
morphic encryption (HE) is best understood in
light of two other important concepts from data
security: encryption systems and data anonymi-
sation. As is shown in this section, HE combines
these two concepts.
An encryption system in its purest form is a pair
of algorithms: one algorithm (‘enc’) encodes data
into ciphertext, a format which is unintelligible
to anyone without access to the second algorithm
(‘dec’) which decodes ciphertext back to data. As
depicted in Figures 1 and 2, it helps to concep-
tualise ‘enc’ as a lock that can be put on data
and ‘dec’ as the corresponding key. This is the
basis of many practical applications of encryp-
tion, including private communication and secure
storage of data work. The security of such a sys-
tem can be defined as how difficult it is to work
out the “key” (or some part of the key) by study-
ing the “lock”. In general, computationally hard
mathematical problems are used as the basis for
encryption systems. For example, the widely-used
Rivest–Shamir–Adleman (RSA) cryptosystem [3]
is based on the difficulty of factorising numbers
into prime factors. Breaking into, or exploiting,
such encryption systems involves coming up with
algorithms to solve these difficult problems and
find keys - potentially even using new hardware
such as quantum computers.
Unlike encryption, data anonymisation is cur-
rently used to protect privacy in scenarios where
data needs to be shared or analysed en masse.
Anonymisation means removing all personally
identifiable information from data. This means
not only removing names, phone numbers and
addresses but also information which could be
combined with other data to deduce the identity
of the subject, such as location data, internet
history or phone records. As depicted in Figure 4,
anonymisation is often done before sharing data
with a third party who may then aggregate it
with other anonymised data before performing
analysis – this is in contrast with the process of
analysing non-anonymised data, as depicted in
Figure 3. In the scenario of Figure 4, it should
be noted that the anonymisation will prevent the
third party from performing some kinds of analy-
sis which may have been possible on the full data
set. Also note that the results of the analysis are
known to the third-party.
Homomorphic encryption incorporates features of
data anonymisation into a new encryption system.
As shown in Figure 5, a homomorphic encryption
system creates a ciphertext which is still unintel-
ligible to anyone without access to the decoding
algorithm but which retains enough structure to
be analysed in encrypted form. This means that
if a third-party can offer superior data analysis
but the data owner doesn’t want them to have
access to the original data, the owner can allow
the third-party to perform the analysis on an en-
crypted copy of the data and return an encrypted
answer, which only the owner can then decode.
Homomorphic encryption as a concept has existed
since the 1980s but it was previously thought that
only certain limited kinds of analysis of the en-
crypted data were possible. So-called “fully” ho-
momorphic encryption (FHE), where any reason-
able computation can be performed on encrypted
data by the third party, was something of a holy
grail in the field for decades. This grail was found
in 2009 when Craig Gentry published the first
scheme for FHE [4].
From Theory to Practice
Gentry’s scheme was a major achievement in cryp-
tographic research but in its original form the
computational overhead for doing analysis on ho-
momorphically encrypted data was too large for
practical applications. Basic operations on en-
crypted data took between 30 seconds and an
hour [5]. However, there have been further break-
throughs in the past 10 years which have narrowed
this performance gap and fully homomorphic en-
cryption has transformed from an unlikely theo-
retical breakthrough to a functional early-stage
technology. There are now industrial implementa-
tions of the technology, such as Microsoft’s Simple
Encrypted Arithmetic Library (SEAL) [6]. Addi-
tionally, several start-ups have emerged offering
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Figure 1: Data encryption.
Figure 2: Data decoding.
Figure 3: Data analysis without data anonymisation.
Figure 4: Data analysis with data anonymisation.
Figure 5: Data analysis using FHE.
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FHE services in the financial sector [7]. The of-
ferings of such companies look set to grow in
technical sophistication and scale in the coming
decade.
From Practice to Policy
The advent of FHE and its increased adoption in
industry raises important policy challenges in the
short and medium term.
In the medium term, homomorphic encryption
could transform transatlantic data diplomacy. As
applications of FHE mature and the range of data
processing services that can be offered homomor-
phically increases, FHE will help to ease current
tensions between the privacy-focused EU and the
innovation-focused US by offering an alternative
channel to move data between European data
collectors and US data analysts without compro-
mising privacy. Policymakers should look to pro-
mote this new technology in establishing a secure
transatlantic trade in data and analysis services.
There are also opportunities in the medium term
for regions in Europe where the focus on privacy
has limited innovation in machine learning to use
FHE as a focus for a new indigenous secure tech
sector which can compete with US-based tech
monopolies.
However, the main short term issue for policy-
makers is classifying homomorphically encrypted
data relative to existing data privacy regula-
tions. Under current legislation such as the EU’s
GDPR and the California Consumer Protection
Act (CCPA), sharing personal data with third
parties is strictly controlled, limiting the kinds of
analysis companies can commission on the data
they collect. Policymakers will need to decide
to what extent homomorphically encrypted data
should be treated as personal data with respect
to these regulations. On the one hand, as this
data cannot be used to identify individuals, al-
lowing sharing may enable valuable aggregation
and analyses of data without compromising con-
sumer privacy, particularly in fields where current
regulation greatly restricts data sharing, e.g. in
healthcare. On the other hand, as companies
gain more freedom to share data in homomor-
phically encrypted form, consumer’s encrypted
data could be analysed by unknown third parties
which are subject to less scrutiny than the original
platform responsible for the data collection. For
third-party companies offering FHE data analy-
sis, there is a risk that their products could be
used to provide analysis on unethically sourced
data as they have no window into the content of
the data. This may lead to complicated issues of
liability for damage caused by any such analysis
or machine learning performed on unethical data.
Uncertainty ahead
As with all emerging technologies, the roadmap
of challenges laid out above is far from complete
and far from certain. Further regulatory diver-
gence between the US and EU, for example, could
push homomorphic encryption into the spotlight
sooner as an alternative method of trading data
and analytics across the Atlantic. Stagnating pro-
cessor speeds [8], on the other hand, could mean
that FHE remains too slow for many applications.
Either way governments need to keep their eyes
on this area.
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